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Abstract 
The increasing importance of information in contemporary societies, as well as the paradoxes of 
information and mainly the uncertainty surrounding its value, raise several questions concerning the 
valuing of information and of information producers by laymen. In our studies we examined whether 
informational goods are undervalued, compared to material goods, by potential buyers and sellers. Also, 
we examined the social representations of information, which provide an insight about the lay meaning of 
information. Finally, we investigated whether the undervaluation of information generalizes to the 
remuneration of professionals producing pure information (invention) compared to those who apply this 
information in order to produce material goods. Results showed that, whereas informational goods are 
devalued compared to material goods, the remuneration of intellectual professionals producing pure 
information is overvalued compared to this of intellectual professionals applying this information to 
produce services or material goods. The investigation of the structure of the social representations of 
information showed that the central core of the representation of information is mainly composed of 
categories referring to traditional media, functions and technologies of information, while contemporary 
functions and technologies are less frequent or absent.  
Keywords: Information’s Valuation, Remuneration of Information-Knowledge Producers, Social 
Representation of Information, Lay Thinking, Uncertainty, Common Knowledge, Involvement 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The increasing importance of information in contemporary societies raises several questions concerning the 
valuation of information and the remuneration of professionals producing information in lay economic 
thinking. Stigler (1961) was the first to show that information is not free but is a useful and exchangeable 
good and that people have limited money and time to search for it. However, information is a paradoxical 
good with uncertain quality and value. Its intrinsic characteristics, mainly its indivisibility, inappropriability, 
intangibility and reproducibility with zero cost lead to a number of paradoxes concerning its economic 
value. Arrow (1962), in a pioneer article which concerns invention but also applies to information, since 
Arrow defines invention as a new information product, suggests that the value of information is not known 
to the buyer until he owns it. Thus, the first paradox is that possessing information is a condition for the 
precise valuation of information’s quality and value. The second paradox concerns uncertainty regarding 
the income that information will provide to its owner or producer. Dionne (1988) states that an agent who 
possesses information can easily exclude others from the consumption of this information, but if he wishes 
to sell the information it will be difficult for him to benefit from the income associated with it, since once it 
has become known to another agent, information can be easily transmitted to others with zero cost.  
Experimental studies who focused on the valuation of information revealed different aspects of the 
uncertainty surrounding information’s economic value. Thus, focusing on risk attitudes and their 
correlation with the value of information, Schoemaker (1989) showed that there is no correlation between 
subjects’ risk attitudes and their preference for probability vs payoff information. Rauchs and Willinger 
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(1996) showed that individuals recognize that perfect information has value since subjects are willing to 
invest more on a risky venture if perfect information is available than if it were not. Nevertheless, 
individuals under-appreciate the value of perfect information because they fail to recognize the importance 
of statistical information in forming judgments (Rötheli, 2001; Meyer & Shi, 1995). Acording to the findings 
of Delquié (2004) who examined the value of information by subjects who had to make a risky choice 
between either perfect information or an option on an uncertain outcome, even though these two 
situations were strategically equivalent and should have been valued identically, subjects did not value the 
two situations in exactly the same way. Finally  Raban and Rafaeli (2006) showed that copy information is 
more strongly undervalued by laymen compared to original information.  
This paper presents a summary of findings issued from five interrelated research studies conducted on the 
lay valuation of information and information producers and on the social representations of information. It 
aims to show the repercussion of the uncertainty surrounding information’s value on its valuation buy 
laymen. It also aims to examine the meaning of information for laymen  and the extend to which the social 
representations of information integrate some of the aspects of information and information processing 
which, in the contemporary societies, endow information with a valuable economic status. 
2 STUDY ONE: BUYERS’ VALUATION OF INFORMATIONAL VS MATERIAL GOODS  
In order to examine the valuation of information by laymen, we carried out an experimental study. In this 
experiment, we presented laymen with experimental conditions, where they could make profit by 
purchasing either valuable information or valuable material goods. The expected profit being  the same for 
both material and informational goods, participants were asked which was the maximum price they were 
willing to pay in order to purchase the good (for details on the experimental manipulation, sample, and 
results, see Sakalaki, & Kazi, 2007).  
The findings of this study showed that, in all conditions under examination, subjects underestimated the 
value of both material and informational goods and, thus, did not behave perfectly rationally. However, 
what is interesting to point out here is not the absolute value attributed to either the informational or 
material goods, but their relative valuation: immaterial goods were systematically undervalued compared 
to material goods (see Table 1). Furthermore, the arguments used to justify valuations differed significantly 
between informational and material products. Participants justified their valuation of information with 
arguments which seem to incorporate the uncertain character of its value, effectiveness and 
trustworthiness, and which therefore suggest the reservations and hesitancy of participants presented with 
informational goods. In contrast, the valuation of material goods was justified by the rational economic 
argument of maximization of profit.  
 
Expected 
profit: 
1,000 € (Low Involvement) 100,000 € (High Involvement) 
Type of  
product:  
Material Data informational Expert 
Informational 
Material Data 
informational 
Expert 
Informational 
Proposed 
price in 
euro 
 
398 
 
148 
 
201 
 
43030 
 
9495 
 
5456 
Percentage 
of 
proposed 
price 
 
39.8 
 
14.8 
 
20.1 
 
43.0 
 
9.5 
 
5.5 
Table 1.   Mean price proposed by potential buyers for data informational, expert informational and 
material goods, under conditions of low and high involvement 
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3 STUDY TWO: THE VALUATION OF INFORMATION BY SELLERS  
A second research (Sakalaki & Kazi, 2009) which included three separate studies investigated:  
(a) If undervaluation of information is also confirmed for sellers. If this is the case, then a strong argument 
appears supporting not only the subjective judgment of individuals about the uncertain value of 
information but the existence of a common knowledge about the value of information. Indeed, in order to 
construct a value, sellers must also take under consideration the potential buyers’ willingness to pay, i.e., 
they must infer how much buyers will accept to pay. In other words, we should then deal with a rather 
consensual judgment, a convention or tacit norm shared by all, a common knowledge concerning the value 
of information: everybody knows that, and everybody knows that all the others know, that information 
worth less than material goods, ceteris paribus.  
b) If the undervaluation of information generalizes to the estimation by laymen of the remuneration of 
professionals producing informational vs material goods. 
c) Finally, we studied the structure and components of the social representations of information. 
In our second study, we presented laymen with experimental conditions, where they could make profit by 
selling either valuable information or valuable material goods (for details on the experimental 
manipulation, sample, and results, see Sakalaki, & Kazi, 2009). Results have replicated the findings of study 
One, showing that material goods are valued more highly, especially in the condition of high expected 
profit by the buyer, whereas the opposite pattern appears when the product for sale is information: in the 
condition of high expected profit by the buyer the proposed selling price for information is even lower. 
When it comes to informational goods, it seems that not only information is, in general, sold at a lower 
price than material products, but that, additionally, sellers of information are even more hesitant to ask for 
a high price when the buyer is going to earn more and should, consequently, pay more in order to obtain 
the good in question. These findings strengthen those previously found, when examining the attitudes of 
buyers of information. 
4 STUDY THREE: DOES THE UNDERVALUATION OF INFORMATION GENERALIZE TO THE 
ESTIMATION OF REMUNERATION OF PROFESSIONALS PRODUCING PURE INFORMATION 
VS PRODUCING MATERIAL PRODUCTS? 
Given the results of Study One and Two, as well as previous findings (Sakalaki & Thépaut, 2005), which 
showed that laymen tend to undervalue informational goods, it was interesting to investigate if laymen also 
undervalue the remuneration of professionals who produce pure information (e.g. researchers or 
inventors), compared to the remuneration of professionals applying knowledge to produce material 
products (e.g., practitioners) (for details on the experimental procedure, sample, and results, see Sakalaki, 
& Kazi, 2009). Results of this study have shown that the work of researchers-inventors, that is information 
producers, was valued more highly in all conditions compared to the work of professionals applying this 
information-knowledge, that is, practitioners (see Table 2).  
 
 Type of profession 
 Psychologist Civil Engineer 
 Researcher 
(n=21) 
Practitioner 
(n=26) 
Researcher 
(n=18) 
Practitioner 
(n=20) 
Proposed remuneration in euro 39571 € 28057 € 47444 € 36750 € 
Table 2.  Mean remuneration proposed by laymen as a function of profession  
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5 STUDY FOUR – PART ONE: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF 
INFORMATION 
In order to reveal the social representations of information, we carried out a fourth study (for details, see 
Sakalaki, & Kazi, 2009). In this study we used the free evocation technique. More specifically, we asked 
participants to write down the first three words that came to their mind when they think about 
“information”. We did not give any other specifications or instructions and, to our knowledge, the 
participants did not have any specific knowledge about management or IT systems. Then, a content analysis 
was applied on the list of words in order to reduce this list into conceptually coherent, exclusive, 
exhaustive, objective and homogenous categories. The categories that emerged were 13, with an 
additional category named “other”, which included all the words that could not be included in any of the 13 
categories and their frequency was too low to form an additional homogenous category. Finally, we applied 
the structural approach method on our data. According to the results of this study, the main elements of 
the central core are the categories news and audio and audio-visual mass media. Thus, what structures 
the representation and makes it meaningful is fundamentally the function of transmitting news via classical 
media. Most of the peripheral elements represent qualifications, utilities, characteristics or uses and 
misuses of this fundamental function (misinformation, illegal manipulation, reliability, objectivity, etc.). 
Although included in the central core, new technologies of information have a comparatively lower 
frequency. Finally it is only in the dynamic area of the periphery of the representation that we find 
elements like knowledge, learning, information processing (see Table 3). 
 
 
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
 Rank of appearance  
 Strong rank of appearance  Weak rank of appearance 
 <1.96 ≥ 1.96 
H
ig
h
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 
>1
7
 
news: 42 (1.62)* 
audio and audiovisual mass media: 29 
(1.62) 
new technologies of information: 21 
(1.76) 
economic objects and concepts: 18 (1.94) 
learning, knowledge and information 
processing: 30 (2.07) 
press, traditional media of information: 24 
(2.67) 
Lo
w
 f
re
q
u
en
cy
 ≤
1
7
 secrets: 5 (1.80)  
 
 
 
 
misinformation: 14 (2.21) 
reliability: 10 (2.00) 
functions and utilities: 11 (2.00) 
interpersonal communication: 6 (2.67) 
illegal and condemned manipulation of 
information: 5 (2.00) 
power: 4 (2.00) 
*The values following each category is the obtained frequency and numbers in parenthesis is the rank value for the 
category. Number of participants: 85, Total number of words provided by participants: 249   
Missing: 6, Rest or “other elements”: 30, Total number of words included in the analysis: 219 
Table 3.   The structure of the social representation of information  
6 STUDY FOUR: PART TWO: A FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE CENTRAL CORE OF THE 
REPRESENTATION OF INFORMATION 
Based on the results of the structural analysis of the representation of information (see Study Four – Part 
One), we created a list which included all the items that emerged from the structural approach described 
above. We presented this list to the 85 participants and we asked them (a) to choose only one item which, 
according to their opinion, was the most closely related to ‘information’, and (b) to choose again one item 
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which they considered that the majority would choose as the most closely related to ‘information’ (for 
details, see Sakalaki, & Kazi, 2009) .  
This method aims to verify whether subjects would chose for themselves the prior element of the core of 
the representation as emerged from the structural analysis and, additionally, to reveal whether there is an 
overlap between the personal choice and the choice attributed to others, that is the perceived consensual 
dimension of the representation.  The findings of this research were slightly different from the previous 
one, in that new technologies of information was the most frequently chosen (by 40 participants), followed 
by news (chosen by 29 participants), TV – radio (chosen by 19 participants), press (19) and knowledge – 
learning (18). When attributing choice to the majority, the order of frequency was as follows: TV – radio 
(63), new technologies of information (45), and news (19).  
7 DISCUSSION 
Our studies aimed to investigate the valuation of information by laymen when they are in the position of 
buyers or sellers of valuable information, compared to laymen who are buyers or sellers of valuable 
material goods. It also aimed to study if the undervaluation of information generalizes to lay estimations of 
the remuneration of professionals producing or transforming pure information versus material goods. 
Finally, a structural approach of the social representation of information intended to analyze the meaning 
attributed to information by socially constructed knowledge. 
Studies 1 and 2 showed that both buyers and sellers systematically underestimate information, both 
absolutely and relatively compared to material goods. That is, they sell and buy information cheaper than 
material goods. The tendency to devalue even more the informational goods in condition of high 
involvement, that is when expected profit, and thus investment and risk for buyers are high, already 
observed in study 1 (Sakalaki and Kazi, 2007) for buyers of information, is confirmed for sellers, even 
though sellers are not directly affected by the economic disadvantages related to the higher risk 
undertaken in condition of high involvement. These findings suggest that the risk associated to the 
purchase of information constitutes a common knowledge: Sellers, just as buyers, seem to think that 
information is less valuable, since they lower information’s price compared to the price of material goods.  
The structural approach of the social representation of information (Study 4) showed that the main 
elements of the central core of the representation refer to rather ancient functions and technologies of 
information like news and audio and audio-visual media (TV and radio). Moreover, the items related to the 
crucial social and economic role of information (e.g. knowledge, learning, information processing), are 
situated in the dynamic zone of the periphery and not in the central core of the representation. Last but 
not least, the reference to cognitive processes applying to creative or innovating uses of information, like 
invention, creative synthesis which lead to scientific knowledge, construction of new ideas, conceptions, 
symbols or forms, which actually constitute, from an economic point of view, the most valuable aspects of 
information processing are totally absent. In other words, the social representation of information has not 
yet integrated some of the most relevant aspects of information which, in the contemporary economic 
systems where the immaterial primes, endow information with a more valuable economic status.  Thus, 
social representations of information provide insight into some reasons, at least, which determine the 
undervaluation of information. 
The results of the third study showed an inversion of the tendency, with participants overestimating 
remunerations of intellectual professionals who produce pure information in comparison to intellectual 
professionals who apply this information in order to produce material or cultural goods. Thus, the 
specificities and paradoxes of information do not appear to generalize to the estimation of the 
remuneration of professionals producing pure information. Probably the work necessary to produce 
scientific knowledge is judged to be more valuable than the work consisting in applying this knowledge, 
independently of the materiality of the outcomes produced. In this case, the indirect utility of information 
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primes on the uncertainty surrounding its value. It is also possible that the lay concept about information 
does not necessarily include science and production of new knowledge, although objectively these 
categories partly coincide with the concept of information since they all refer to informational - immaterial 
elements. It is noteworthy that the concept of science is absent both from the central core and the 
peripheral elements of the representation of information.    
The above questions should be examined in other cultural contexts in order to see if these findings can be 
generalised. The interference between scientific and lay assumptions about information, as well as the 
relationship between the constructs of information and science in lay thinking must also be further 
investigated by future studies. The undervaluation of the former do not generalize to the later, perhaps 
because science and scientific products incorporate the surplus conferred  by the long studies required in 
order to produce or transform this specific kind of informational good, independently of the material, 
immaterial or cultural nature of the product issued from scientific activity. Therefore, accumulation of 
knowledge and knowing-how procedures and activation of this knowledge in order to invent or create new 
information is a competence highly valuated by lay thinking while, paradoxically, the product issued from 
this kind of expert activity, is represented as less valuable.  
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